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Geographical knowledges, universities and academic freedom
I want to offer some perspectives on the university as an institution, on the conditions of
knowledge production that should prevail in that institution, and on how those
conditions affect the kinds of geographical knowledges circulating within and beyond
universities. In recent years, there has been a lot of published debate in geography books,
journals, e-lists and newsletters about making the professional knowledges we collectively
produce more ‘relevant’. While that (perennial) debate is worth having, my focus here is
rather different. Instead of discussing what we do (or should do) with the geographical
knowledges we produce through research and teaching, I want to look at the institutional
conditions that underpin the production of professional geographic knowledge in the
first place. My main question is this: what sorts of institutional conditions produce what
kinds of geographical knowledges? More specifically: what understanding of universities
is most conducive to maximising the plurality of geographical knowledges and avoiding
the tendential hegemony of one or more modes of knowledge now and in the future? I
ask this latter question because it seems to me that democratic societies need,
constitutively, to foster diversity in the realm of claims-making: this is one guarantor of
their health. Without sounding pompous, universities remain (and should remain) a key
site where a multiplicity of cognitive, moral and aesthetic perspectives on the world
flourish. As such, they are essential institutions of democracies are to remain just that:
societies where different viewpoints can not only be heard but accorded respect, even as
they may be subject to searching criticism.
These introductory comments having been made, my arguments proceed telegraphically
as a series of points. I write, as some readers already know, with a personal and
professional stake in the continued existence and vibrancy of a broad and plural ‘critical
human geography’. The first thing to say is obvious: geographical knowledges matter in
the double sense that they are cover issues that are technically, cognitively, morally and
aesthetically important and they have palpable effects. As Derek Gregory (2004) rightly
observes in The Colonial Present, the schoolyard rhyme about the power of words ‘Sticks
and stones will break my bones …’ has never been accurate: as he says, “it affords
neither protection nor solace” (p. xiv). Like Gregory I take it as axiomatic that
geographical knowledges actively shape the thoughts, actions and self-understanding of

those who purvey and consume these knowledges, wittingly or not. They are productive
as well as produced.
The second thing to say is equally obvious: that universities are merely one site where
geographical knowledges are produced and from which they circulate into the wider
society. Universities and their disciplinary constituents may once have held a nearmonopoly on the production of formalised, non-colloquial knowledge. These days,
however, they exist in societies (at least here in the West) where the volume and diversity
of knowledge has expanded in proportion to the number of institutions and actors in the
knowledge-producing business – for instance, the media, think tanks, research institutes,
NGOs, charities and religious bodies like the Scientologists. As David Harvey
memorably insisted in 1974, we should ask of these knowledges not whether they are
‘true’ or false’ but, rather, “what it is that produces them and what they serve to
produce” (p. 162). These knowledges are part of what Henry Giroux (2000) terms a
‘public pedagogy’ in which people receive quotidian instruction about the world beyond
their doorstep. They are politics by other means.
Thirdly, in recent years not just but especially left-wing academics have bemoaned what’s
been call ‘the new higher education’ or simply ‘New U’. This is certainly true in human
geography where people like Neil Smith (2000) now describe Western public universities
as ‘sausage factories’. Despite the considerable intra and international differences in
Western HE systems, the big narrative goes something like this: universities are behaving
in more business-like ways, national states are hard-wiring universities more directly into
wealth production, students are increasing interpellated as consumers and investors in
their own human capital, and academic staff are less free than heretofore as they
grumpily enact what philosopher Gillian Howie (2005: 6) sardonically calls “company
policy”.
I think this narrative can be overstated. We should, as educational sociologist Rob
Cuthbert suggests, “avoid … hackneyed and ungrounded cries de couer …” (2000: 243).
For instance, Paul Trowler’s (1998) book Academics responding to change – which is about
UK higher education – identifies an ‘implementation gap’ that has frustrated the attempts
of ministers, civil servants and university managers to corporatise British universities.
This is not, of course, to say that nothing has changed; clearly, much has altered in British

universities, as it has in virtually all other Western tertiary sectors. But I suspect we’re in
the middle of a ‘long revolution’: there is still time to use our remaining status and
freedom as public professionals to offer a vision of university education that does not
accommodate instrumentalism to the exclusion of everything else in the production,
teaching and use of geographical knowledge. (Castree, 2002). As I will explain below, I
think senior geographers and established academics more generally have a special role to
play here.
My fourth point is that I suspect few of us possess a thought-through conception of
what universities should actually do or what they stand for, despite spending our working
lives in these institutions. This is certainly true among left critics in human geography
who, to date, are clear about what they’re against – i.e. corporatised universities – but not
so sure what they’re for, if the published literature is anything to go by (for instance, a
special issue of Antipode [2000] that I co-edited is long on diagnosis and short on ideas
about ‘what is to be done?’). We need, I would argue, a positive thesis about the university’s
function that can galvanise and motivate those of us who are nervous about the drift of
Western higher education. Certainly, those on the left of human geography and other
social sciences have been often vociferous critics of the ‘new U’. But what notion of the
university do we seek to uphold?
Here I think we shouldn’t be afraid to be a bit old fashioned. The educational sociologist
Andrew Wernick recently argued that “[Left] … thinking about the contemporary
university seems inhibited by progressivist prejudices that leave it, in the end, both
unwilling to affirm the intellectual vocation as such and uncomfortable before anything
that might smack of nostalgia … for what is being obliterated” (Wernick, 2003: 143). If
he’s right – and I think he is – we could do worse than resurrect a rather venerable idea
of the university’s role: as, to quote sociologist Steve Fuller (2000: 113), “that …
institution resolutely devoted to the pursuit of inquiry as such …”.
This idea has, of course, acted as unseen compass in most Western universities for
decades; for decades too it has arguably been honoured in the breach, especially in socalled Big Science where the state or business has used the visible hand of earmarked
funding to favour certain modes of inquiry. In metaphorical terms, this idea posits the
university as a republic of knowledge where justified technical, cognitive, moral and

aesthetic claims about the world are, in principle, tolerated regardless of their content. In such
an institution knowledge is not beholden to special interests but is genuinely public. And
this is guaranteed by a formal separation between the provenance and the uses of
knowledge. The value of this separation is that knowledge made and shared through
research, publishing and teaching can serve many interests simultaneously without being
subservient to any one of them. So, in essence, this notion of the university upholds its
admittedly patchy democratic heritage: as a site of free expression so long as certain
standards of logic and evidence are observed in the conduct of claims-making.
This brings me, fifthly, back to geographical knowledges, specifically those produced by
professional geographers. There’s a lot of geographical knowledge outside academe that
has nefarious uses, as Derek Gregory’s book shows very powerfully; but equally,
geographical knowledges produced within the academy can be made to serve special
interests (for instance, think of geography’s historical complicity with colonialism and the
present-day military uses of GIS). Equally, though, some geographical knowledges can
offer fresh and often highly critical perspectives on what passes for common sense in the
wider world. For instance, though feminism and anti-racism hardly originated in
universities, since the 60s these institutions have nurtured and propelled forward both
bodies of thought and practice despite a backlash against them in certain sections of
Western society. It follows that in the medium-to-long term, we need to avoid a situation
where the grounds of academic freedom are undermined: that is, a situation where
certain actual or potential lines of intellectual inquiry cannot be pursued because of the
real or imagined ‘needs’ of constituencies outside the university.
In my view human geography, like the social sciences and humanities more generally, can
act as a bulwark against the normalising tendencies that many of us see in ‘the new HE’.
Critical human geography, for instance, has flourished in British universities despite the
RAE and all the rest, and has helped create a discipline of enormous internal diversity and
vitality in terms of its constituent knowledge-claims and communities. Over the next
thirty years, those communities will have a professional stake in maintaining that diversity
rather than reducing it to suit the perceived demands of students, government, firms or
‘user-groups’

My penultimate point is that all this relates to that fabulously rich and polysemic term
whose meaning is always worth struggling over: namely, value. I’d be prepared to say that
academic freedom is an absolute good – a value in itself. Why? Because it prevents one or
other kind of knowledge being seen as especially valuable over and above any other kinds.
In other words, academic freedom is the value that allows other values to find a home.
As the philosopher Gordon Graham (2002) argues in his little book Universities, if all
academic knowledge is made to serve one or other social need – like graduate
employability – then we lose one important source of ideas for engendering economic,
cultural and moral change in society.
My final comment relates to practical actions to uphold academic freedom within and
beyond the discipline of geography. Ultimately, the national state remains the best
guarantor of academic freedom to the extent that it upholds the idea that universities
have the right to be self-governing. This idea is, of course, under attack here in Britain,
albeit in the cunning guise of us all disciplining ourselves to conform to the contentless
culture of RAE, national teaching assessment etc. In departments like my own we are all,
in some senses, acting in loco politicus for external initiatives designed to make British
universities more responsive to economic needs. Two ways to reverse this trend strike
me as quite important. First, and most obviously, I think senior figures in geography and
other disciplines have a special responsibility to articulate a vision of what universities’
function should properly be. I’m not suggesting that they originate such a vision: that is
and should be a collective endeavour. But I am suggesting that these figures have a
privileged role in upholding (or not) an idea of what universities are for that can serve the
interests of the diverse constituency of researchers and teachers that comprise geography
and myriad other disciplines. The difficulty, of course, is that professional success often
means that one accepts the blandishments of the prevailing regime. It takes courage to
draw a line in the sand if you and those whose interests you notionally represent think it
necessary to do so. Secondly, and less obviously, I think the rest of us need to recognise
how important it is to undertaken the endless, mundane work of speaking against the
drip-drip of outside initiatives that erode academic freedom. Such speaking against can
take the form of objections raised in faculty meetings, criticisms made in formal invited
responses to HEFCE position papers, and so on. As Christopher Hitchens (2001: 3)
notes, “most people, most of the time, prefer to seek approval or security”, and he
reminds us that “doing nothing is also a decision” (ibid. 83). I think that if we wish to

uphold the freedom to research and teach more-or-less as we please, we need to take
time out from researching and teaching and attend to the micropolitics of procedure and
policy as it impacts our daily lives. It’s one thing to write about this micropolitics – I’ve
done so myself in several geography journals. It’s quite another to act and to get others in
one’s department to act with you.
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